Image of the Region in Eurasian Studies

Edited by
Suchandana Chatterjee

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies
Kolkata

in association with

KW Publishers Pvt Ltd
New Delhi
CONTENTS

Introduction ix

ESSAYS

1. The Kazakh Steppe of the 19th-Early 20th Century: The Northernmost End of the Muslim World or the Southern Limit of the Eurasian Space? 1
   Sveta Kovalskaya

2. The Practice of Regional Description in the Military Science of the Russian Empire “Military and Statistical Analysis” and Its Practical Uses Later in the 19th–Early in the 20th Centuries 17
   Sergey Lyubichankovskiy

   Hari Vasudev

4. The Soviet Union, Nationalism and the Colonial Question: Revisiting the Comintern Era 55
   Sohanalal Datta Gupta

5. Russia’s Policy Towards Central Asia in the Post-Soviet Period 73
   Raj Kumar Kohari

   Sharad K. Soni

7. The Central Asia Factor in India-Afghanistan Relations 101
   Anwesha Ghosh

8. Nation-building or National Revival in Turkmenistan: From Dependence to Independence 117
   Lopamudra Bandyopadhyay
9. Post-Soviet Media in Central Asia: 
   With Special Focus on Coverage of Presidential 
   Elections of Kyrgyzstan
   Mohamad Reyiz
   135

10. Europeanisation at the “Grassroots” Level in Moldova: 
    What Are Effective Ways to Deal with the Transnistrian Conflict?
    Keiji Sato
    155

11. Comparing Post-communism “Big” and “Small”: 
    The Inaugural Elections in Russia and Macedonia
    Dmitry Seltser
    169

12. The Boundaries of EU Norms: Examining EU’s External and 
    Internal Power Using Aboriginal Subsistence 
    Whaling as Case Study
    Minori Takahashi
    185

13. Eurasian Economic Union: Opportunities and Challenges
    R. G. Giddahhidi
    199

14. Silk Road as an Integrative Concept: 
    The Twenty-first Century Scenario
    Sreemati Ganguli
    211

15. Contextualising Anton Chekhov in the Literary 
    Traditions of His Time
    Jayshree Roy
    223

16. Representing the Caucasus in Russian Literature: 
    Creative Writings “Then” and “Now”
    Ranjana Saxena
    233

17. Socialist Realism Architecture and Soviet Cinema: 
    The All-Union Agricultural Exhibition (VSKhV) in 
    the Radiant Path
    Akiko Honda
    253

18. Presentation and Representation: Subjectivity Through History in 
    The Sky of My Childhood
    Rashmi Doraiswamy
    275

19. Reinventing Culture: The Tajik Experience of Post-Soviet Years
    Nandini Bhattacharya
    287

REFLECTIONS

20. Eurasian Culture/Arts of Central Asia: 
    The Case of Tajikistan
    Munira Shahidi
    301

21. India-Tajikistan Relations in the 20th-21st Centuries: 
    The Evolution of Cultural Ties
    Umedjon Majidi
    317

ANNEXURE

Media of Central Asia at a Glance
    329
11. **Comparing Post-communism “Big” and “Small”: The Inaugural Elections in Russia and Macedonia**

*Dmitry Seliver*

---

**The Argument**

This paper aims to compare the inaugural elections in Macedonia and Russia. At one point in time, both countries were Socialist states. Macedonia used to be part of former Yugoslavia while Russia was the main state belonging to the former Soviet Union. There is, however, a difference in the scale and degrees of comparison between the two countries. The population of Macedonia is slightly above 2 million people. The population of contemporary Russia is currently above 143 million. The Macedonian territory comprises roughly 25 thousand square kilometres while Russia is gigantic—nearly 18 million square kilometres. Russia was the most developed among the Soviet Socialist Republics. Macedonia was the least developed republic in former Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union as a body was formed literally around Russia, while the Yugoslavian Federation was formed around Serbia, with Macedonia being a small part of its periphery.

This is the broad reason why this paper is entitled “Comparing Post-communism Big and Small.” The title, of course, is just wordplay: it is understood that there is no such thing as large post-communism and small post-communism formally. Rather, the aim here is to show how the democratic political process developed and evolved in both the biggest and smallest Socialist countries.
What tasks and/or problems do “inaugural elections” decide and solve?

Democratic transition theory considers “inaugural elections” as the crucial starting point. It is the first cycle of free elections taking place after a people have rejected authoritarianism. In this process of democratic transition, “inaugural elections” are meant to do several things: first, create a new system of political institutions; second, form a party system; third, legitimise the new political regimes; and fourth, limit and hinder the possibilities for any return to non-democratic forms of government. In other words, “inaugural elections” are the first and most essential stage for democratic transition.

What kind of transition results ought to be seen in real terms?

- “Inaugural elections” need to reflect an understanding among elite groups. That is, we should get a sense of political agreement and consensus between governing elites and the opposition groups.
- “Inaugural elections” ought to be on the fast track. That is, they should be held immediately after the fall of the authoritarian regime.
- “Inaugural elections” should be all-encompassing. That is, power must be democratically chosen from all levels of the society.
- “Inaugural elections” ought to take place under the conditions of a functioning multiparty system. These last two aspects are absolutely complementary to each other.
- “Inaugural elections” ought to be the way and means for democratising an all-encompassing socio-political system. In other words, the elections themselves are not only a mechanism for the realisation of technical problems, but are in fact an instrument for the real-term democratisation of society as a whole.
- The people must have trust in the outcome of the “inaugural elections.”
- Finally, “inaugural elections” must change the attitude of political elites. In any case, this is the experience of most of the countries that have undergone transition—after losing the people’s faith, the elites end up losing the inaugural elections.

What are the election trends and results of the “inaugural elections” in Russia and Macedonia?

The Russian Case

1. Pact/Consensus

It is difficult to find direct evidence of “pacts/agreement/consensus in Russia. The elite and opposition groups never reached a consensus until now. The various branches of power began to confront one another. This confrontation led in part to the storming of the Russian White House in 1993 and the dissolution of the entire system of representative government. In fact, this was a massive inter-elite collision. In light of this, it is important to emphasise that in August 1991 the President of Russia and the Supreme Soviet were steadfast partners in the fight against the leadership of the Communist Party of the USSR.

2. Speed

Boris Yeltsin did not fast-track the “inaugural elections” and decided upon them only when he was certain that the state was secure to the greatest extent possible. Until then it was highly likely that he was ready to postpone it, if not outright cancel the presidential elections in 1996. If that had taken place, then the “inaugural elections” in Russia would have formally been illegitimate. That is, the “inaugural elections” in Russia would have in large measure been a deferred project. How is this so? Analysts of the party “Democratic Russia” had themselves predicted large-scale defeats of Yeltsin supporters (for example, they predicted only 10-12 victories across in all gubernatorial elections). It was this very prognosis which served as the basis to realise the plan that would come to be known as the “executive vertical.” The establishment of the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Russian Federation on November 1, 1991 created a moratorium on all elections across the board until December 1, 1992. There is one small caveat to add here, however: I should note that in Russia at the time it was highly unlikely that there were any civil service cadres not, in one way or another, connected to the Communist Party of the USSR.

3. The Levels of Hierarchy Where Elections Took Place.

With the onset of transition, President Yeltsin ended up not conducting elections of any kind: there were no presidential elections (one needs
to recall that Yeltsin himself was appointed President by the RSFSR on June 12, 1991; there were no parliamentary elections (the AllUnion RSFSR was appointed in the spring of 1990); there were no gubernatorial elections (they were all initially appointed); there were no regional legislative elections (they were appointed in 1990 and still carried Soviet nomenclatures); there were no elections for the heads of administrations of cities and regions (governors appointed them); and finally there were no elections for local municipalities (the subregional soviets were appointed in 1990). Even after the storming of the Russian White House, authorities did not conduct elections across the board, even though it is likely that it would have been popularly supported and easy to enact. In the end, only the Federal Duma (December 1993) and regional legislatures (Spring 1994) were elected. Few today seem to remember these facts, but it is important to point out that from 1993 to 1995-96 local self-administration (i.e., the city and regional administrative heads) in "democratic" Russia was represented only by appointees!

4. Party System

There was a sharp dichotomy in the party system of Russia—drawn along "communist-democratic" lines. There was no multiparty system that developed—only diametrically opposite poles emerged as choices: "Democrats" on the one side and "Communists" on the other.

5. The Democratisation of the Socio-political Set-up

The possibility to democratise the socio-political set-up was ultimately blocked by the refusal to conduct quick "inaugural elections," establishing the practice of naming appointees, and creating the "power vertical" in 1991. The "power vertical" was NOT an intellectual product of the Vladimir Putin team, but rather was the norm of governmental foundations under Yeltsin.

6. Societal Trust in Power

Yeltsin during perestroika was the idol of tens of millions of Soviet people. The people believed in two "miracles"—Yeltsin and the elections. But Yeltsin did not conduct elections, and as a consequence the people once again lost faith and trust in the power of government. However, this general phenomenon still survives today, only with a different degree of poignancy.

7. Elite Transition

The current Russian experience about elite attitude will be examined based on the evidence across seven regions of the former Soviet Union and present-day Russian Federation. More detailed analyses can be found published with various authors in monographs and co-authored articles. In this article the logic and results of elite transition across the seven regions of Russia (Ryazan, Samara, Ulyanovsk, Tambov, Mordovia, Udmurria, and Chuvashia) are being compared to the Macedonian case. To be more specific, the local level was specifically examined in Macedonia. The issue was that the former Soviet Union/Russian Federation has three administrative hierarchies—federal, regional, and subregional—whereas in Macedonia there are only two levels: national and local.

Thus, in 1991 the new authorities underwent a "democratic" transition. The procedure they developed, born from the President's inner circle, was quite simple: the President would appoint governors while these, in turn, would appoint the heads of subregional administrations.

Table 1. Recruiting the heads of city and county administration (1991-1992)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Heads</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>U</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 1st secretary | 4 | 10 | 4 | 7 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 32 | 16.2 |
| 2nd secretary | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |


mayors of the city and county executive committees. Thus by 1991, the new federal authorities had a disclaimer connected with their performance. This was evident in President Yeltsin’s decree of July 20, 1991—“About the dismantling of the party” (O deportatsyi). In the Republic of Mordovia, for example, the local apparatchiks reacted sharply to the decree and started looking for new engagements. In the Republic of Bashkortostan only 34 city and county secretaries remained, in Tambov Oblast only 13 remained. In most cases the replacements would lead to a demotion—being replaced as second secretaries with no future prospects. These arrangements worked at the most for a few weeks. These people were devoid of decision-making in the real sense and were wholly unsuited as heads of the local administration. The only option was the First Secretaries who became a source of regional support for the federal centre, but was not, in any way, better.

The changes are connected with different circumstances. Perhaps the major change was the shifting of the bosses of various regions. This change was the main mechanism for establishing appointees belonging to Yeltsin’s power structure. It is appropriate to consider them as “agents of influence” for the federal centre across the regions.

Table 2. “Agents of Influence” for the federal centre in the regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Name of regional leader</th>
<th>Mini-political bio</th>
<th>Subregional politics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Samara</td>
<td>K. A. Titov (appointed)</td>
<td>Deputy director of “Informatika,” Chair of city soviet (1990)</td>
<td>Support the exec. committee chair and his recent subordinates</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In more than half of the cases (52%), the heads of administration were recruited from the chairs of the city and county executive committees. The directorate and first secretaries lagged significantly behind, with only 17.3% and 16.2% respectively. The deputy chairs of the executive committees, the chairs and deputy chairs of the soviets added to the impressive success of Soviet apparatchiks (5.1% and 4.6% respectively). In total, it worked out that 118 people came to leadership positions in the subregions (59.9%) directly from the Soviet nomenclature apparatus. Most importantly, there were no striking inter-regional differences in terms of percentage, barring a few exceptions. In Ryazan Oblast the chairs of the executive committees of the Soviets achieved an extraordinary 75.9%. In Samara Oblast the divergent result came from the first secretaries with 28.6%. In Udmurtia, the agricultural directors were greatly represented with 34.5%.

This collision acted as a direct hit on the authority of the first secretaries acting as the new chairs of local soviets and figuratively felt like someone was playing a cruel joke on them (in Tambov Oblast and the Republic of Chuvashia, for example). This “contra-elite” worked against the first secretaries/new soviet chairs, blocking all their attempts to penetrate the elite local power structure. Recruiting for the new elite thus came mostly from an old reservoir of power—the old guard Soviet party nomenclature with its preservation of an unadulterated pre-perestroika rhetoric. In opposition to this development a democratic movement did emerge but in reality the aforementioned contra-elites had, by 1991, formed the foundation of regional power.

In regions where the first secretaries performed less creditably in 1990, an immediate replacement was made in favour of the chairs/
but simply exited into the oblast structures as the new heads of local administration needed experienced and young administrators. These first secretaries of the provinces who ended up in the oblast centre were considered not dangerous and therefore acceptable. For example, First Secretary of the Kotovsk city committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, O. I. Betin, became the First Deputy Head of the Tambov Oblast administration in 1999. Nowadays, Betin is now Governor of Tambov Oblast. In this way, nearly a quarter of the leaders of the subregions were able to preserve a primary spot for themselves in the local organs of power.

The Macedonian Case
As politologists, we can ideally speak about the case-to-case democratic trends in the aftermath of Socialist order in the Communist bloc. The first step to democracy in Macedonia was quite different and unexpected.

1. Pacts/Consensus/Agreement
In Macedonia, in strong contrast to Russia, the elite pact/consensus was an objective reality. Here the stark division of society into proponents and opponents of socialism are not seen. My field research in the Macedonian republic based on in-depth interviews with Communist Party cadres was conducted during April and May 2012. All interviewees—whether it was the former Secretary of the Central Committee Union of Communists of Macedonia or the Heads of Party Committees from cities all over the republic had one common perception—there was “another socialism” in Yugoslavia. This socialism was different from Soviet socialism. Both the elite groups and society in general in Macedonia wanted a democratic transition. Consequently, there was no room for lack of consensus or to reject the political arrangements. Civil war or social tension was to be avoided. The leaders of the Macedonian Communist party wanted to hold power in new Macedonia but wanted to achieve that status through elections. The opposition too was extremely hopeful about regaining power through elections. This mutual interest became the motivating factor for the two sides to come to an arrangement or a pact.
2. Pace/Speed
Elections took place in Macedonia in 1990 even before there was an official declaration of independence from Yugoslavia. These elections decided the most critical political problems and whoever won the elections would be the de facto power.

3. On the Levels of Hierarchy Where Elections Took Place
In Macedonia elections were held simultaneously at the level of the government as well as at the level of society. The first multiparty parliamentary elections in Macedonia took place on November 11 (this was the first round) and December 23 (this was the second round) in 1990. The democratic nature of the elections would have had a general consensus and would have been unchallenged were it not for the country’s presidential elections. On January 27, 1991 Kiro Gligorov was appointed as the First President of the Republic of Macedonia not through popular elections but through the session of the General Assembly of the Republic. In this discrepancy, we see the defect in the “inaugural elections” of the Macedonian case.

But this is not the only thing to talk about. The election to the post of Heads of the local assemblies was also not open to all. They were elected through an electoral college—formed from the Deputies of the local assemblies. In an interview to the newspaper Fokus, President Gligorov explained the logic behind this decision: the authorities of Macedonia at that time were afraid of separatistleanings cropping up in various parts of the country. They knew about political forces, both inside and outside the country, which had plans of new autonomous ethnic enclaves. Ultimately, this line of strategic thinking could be seen as leading to the demise of the said enclaves and the formation of new neighbouring states now “adjacent” to Macedonia instead of being part of the Republic. For this reason, they devised a strategy that would make Heads of local assemblies loyal to the centre.

4. Party System
The Macedonian case had a lot of public attention especially as it indicated trends of a multiparty system. This phenomenon was noticeable in 1990 just as it is today. It is possible that the level of societal attention was higher here in Macedonia than in the rest of the Communist bloc. This is just a hypothesis, of course, but it certainly deserves greater attention and empirical research. Moreover, it was acknowledged by society in general, and specifically by the leadership of the Union of Communists of Macedonia, that elections needed to take place on a fair, honest and multiparty basis.

Here it is necessary to elaborate on the logic of the working of a multiparty system in Macedonia: it needs to be pointed out that, in contrast to Russia, there were no Communist Parties in the strict sense of the term and, in the broader sense, there was no strong ideological representation within society. There is an important difference between Macedonia and Russia: the former did not have the pronounced conflict between “Communists” and “democrats” compared to the latter in 1990.

In Macedonia the law on elections of June 17, 1990 created a very simple registration system for political parties. In essence, the registration procedure was very simple. The Ministry of Internal Affairs confirmed the decision about official registration of a party. The Communist Union of Macedonia added the words “Party of Democratic Transformation” and became the Communist Union of Macedonia—Party of Democratic Transformation (CUM-PDT). Petar Goshev, the earlier Secretary of the CUM and a member of the Presidium of the Communist Union of Yugoslavia, was appointed head of the party. The party ultimately won 31 out of 120 seats in the first parliamentary elections in 1990, which made it the second largest party in the Parliament.

Similar to the CUM-PDT was the Reformist Union of Yugoslavia (RUY) which was created on October 16, 1990. The head of the party—Stoyan Andov—was a former Yugoslav Ambassador to Iraq from 1991 to 1996 and was the Chair of the Assembly of the Macedonian Republic from 2000 to 2002. The Socialist Party of Macedonia (SPM) was founded in July 1990 and Lyubisav Ivanov was appointed its head. What this signifies is that most of the influential political parties in Macedonia were founded on the basis of the original Macedonian Communist party. Eighteen political parties and unions took part in the first parliamentary elections with 11,550 candidates, signifying an intense level of party activism within Macedonia.
The democratisation of the socio-political system—it was a
democratic and politicised system.

5. Societal Trust in Power
Societal trust in Macedonian take-over of power was high from the
very beginning.

6. Elite Transformation
The elections for the heads of local municipalities were not universal
and direct. An electoral college of sorts voted for them, consisting of
members of municipal assemblies that were originally elected to those
positions on a multiparty basis. Just as with the parliamentary elections,
these elections at the local level progressed in two tours—on November
11 and December 23, 1990. For the posts of deputies of municipal
assemblies there were in general 1,510 places with 5,546 candidates
competing for the openings (nearly four candidates for every single
deputy post).

Table 3. Indices for Electoral Lists for the
Posts of Local Municipality Deputies, 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>№</th>
<th>Electoral List</th>
<th>No. of Candidates</th>
<th>No. of Deputy Posts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>SKM-PDP</td>
<td>1,320</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>SPM</td>
<td>1,203</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>SRSM</td>
<td>942</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>VMRO-DPMNE</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>MAAK</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>PDPM</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>SDPM</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Democratic League</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Yugoslavian Position in the SRM</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>MDPDM (Young Democratic Progressives of Macedonia)</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>PPETSRM</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Democratic Union—Farmers’ Party of Macedonia</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Independent candidates</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>DSTM</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The deputies of the local municipalities were sworn in on January
30, 1991. In turn sessions were organised to conduct the elections
for heads of local municipalities. The deputies elected these heads
from their own representatives in the General Assembly. The overall
democratisation of this event became evident as these elections
proceeded in consultation with the political parties represented in the
General Assembly.

And so, what were the electoral realities? In the final tally there
were representatives from six political parties filling the chairs of local
municipality chiefs (in all there were 29 positions).

Table 4. The Correlation between Parties in the Deputy Assembly and
Heads of Local Municipalities (HLM)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>№</th>
<th>Electoral List</th>
<th># of Deputies</th>
<th># of HLM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>SKM-PDP</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>SPM</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>SRSM</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>VMRO-DPMNE</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>PDPM</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A decisive victory was achieved by the SKM-PDP party (a total
of 17 seats). All of the remaining political parties were able to occupy
a mere 12 seats. How was it possible for the secretaries of the local
municipality committees of the SKM to achieve such a decisive
victory? Were they able to hold on to power continually in 1991?
This analysis answers some of the key questions regarding these
issues. For instance, how did their political and economic careers
fare moving on into the future?
Out of the 31 seats for the heads of local municipalities, there were six former committee secretaries of the Communist Party. In three instances these Heads also became Deputies of the General Assembly. What happened to the remaining Heads? Three among them turned into professional activists with the recently created Social Democratic Union of Macedonia and subsequent Deputies of the Republic of Macedonia Assembly. Seven became Directors of state-run industrial enterprises. Nine people returned to work according to their expertise and among them were university professors, school teachers, engineers, economists, lawyers, and medical doctors. Thus, 10 people in one way or the other continued their political career (either as heads of local municipalities, deputies of the parliament, or party activists); seven former party secretaries, utilising the terminology of some of the first Russian research on transition, “exchanged power for property.” The rest simply returned to their civilian lives and to their respective spheres of influence. The logic of the Velvet Revolution and the traditionally peaceful and stable conditions across local communities created for them comfortable opportunities to re-integrate into the life of post-socialist Macedonia. That is, 10 of the most influential party officers at the local level perfectly transitioned into the politico-administrative context of the new Macedonia; seven became the owners of powerful industries in Macedonia as a result of privatisation; the remaining number became specialists with decent incomes. In other words, the local communities were not averse to the former party leaders. The majority of these people came for party work “from their professions”—this often meant they were coming from the now defunct Communist Party of Yugoslavia. At the time of elections, they were replaced for the post of heads of local municipalities in 1991 by the same group of lawyers (8), economists (7), engineers (6), pedagogues (5) journalists, sportsmen, technologists, veterinary surgeons and doctors. Moreover, the former secretaries of the committees of the SKM once again became the leaders of local administration (not as secretaries of the party organs but as the heads of local municipalities).

To sum up, firstly, it is apparent that (a) local elections in Macedonia created in the municipality assemblies a situation of domination for the SKM/SKM-PDP; (b) a marked reinvigoration of activists at the party level took place, particularly visible at the level of Macedonia’s local municipalities; (c) it is obvious that former party actors re-entered transitional phase politics in independent Macedonia.

Conclusion
What are the similarities and differences in the Russian and Macedonian cases of “inaugural elections”?

There are similarities in the fact that there were fundamental limitations in both Russian and Macedonian cases. In Russia those limitations were large, while in Macedonia they were less significant but still present. In both countries authorities were not consistent in the manner in which democratic elections were established and conducted. In fact, it is more accurate to say that Russian authorities more consistently lacked the desire to conduct such elections. Such elections were held only after the events of 1993. The Russian “inaugural elections” can be arguably categorised as deferred. In Macedonia, meanwhile, only the country’s Parliament was elected through classical democratic mechanisms.

What hindered democratic processes in Russia and Macedonia? In Russia there were two main reasons: first, the fear of the Yeltsin team about losing power. His analytical team predicted that the group of August 1991 events would not have been victorious if there were direct Presidential, parliamentary or gubernatorial elections. Second, there was hardly any effective governance in the regions and there was no governor upon whom the Yeltsin team could rely.

One must not forget that Macedonia is part of the Balkan peninsula. A very strong nationalist factor is in play here. The country’s new authorities were not, therefore afraid of a so-called Communist renaissance. They were more afraid of Albanian separatism and the further division of what was already a small state.

The biggest difference resides in the fact that democratisation in Macedonia took place with much less political conflict and was faster, more consistent and more purposeful. The country did not divide along “red” and “white” lines. Political parties played and continue to play a major role in national politics. Successive parliamentary elections
always produced new party leaders in Macedonia. Consequently, there was and is always a revitalisation of the political elite in Macedonia.

In Russia, throughout the 1990s there were conflicts and societal divisions. “Inaugural elections” were therefore delayed and when they did take place, analyses were motivated to call them democratic. This is especially so when one discusses the Presidential elections of 1996.

Reference

12. The Boundaries of EU Norms: Examining EU’s External and Internal Power Using Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling as Case Study

Minori Takahashi

Introduction
The fact that the European Union (EU) is gaining influence as an agent that formulates norms has been pointed out on a number of occasions. In such debates, as indicated by Ian Manners and other researchers, the spotlight is on “normative power” as an aspect of EU’s influence on other regions. The “EU as a normative power” does not only connote a passive meaning in which the EU is only creating standards and models for action, but also possesses a dynamic role: EU’s orientation or normative influence on other regions and EU’s creation, maintenance and management of global markets through the exercise of that influence. Since, as a normative power, the EU projects its influence on the global arena, it is often called “an externally-oriented power.” The EU’s external power, of course, does not arise spontaneously. It is institutionalised based on the premise of a consensus between 27 countries (28 countries from July 2013 onwards) and then projected outside the EU area. In that sense it may be said that the consensus between the 27 member states is an internally-oriented power that supports the Union’s externally-oriented power. In other words, EU norms are shaped through the interaction of such internally and externally oriented powers.

The EU, which today comprises 27 state political actors, has created space for conflicting interests and a competition of opposing ideas. However, when a certain premise is transformed into a norm through