MUTATING POWER: 
TRACKING THE CHANGES IN AUTHORITY 
OF THE SUB-REGIONAL COMMUNIST PARTY NOMENCLATURE 
DURING LATE-STAGE SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET SOCIALISM 
(1985-2005)

D.G. Seltser¹, M.D. Crosston²

Tambov State University after G.R. Derzhavin (1); 
Clemson University, USA (2)

Represented by Professor A.A. Slesin and 
a Member of Editorial Board Professor V.I. Konovalov

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Abstract: What had happened to the KPSS nomenclature since the beginning of the Gorbachev’s perestroika? To answer this question, a comparative study of seven Russian regions, a unique research project in Russian political science agenda, has been launched. Post-Soviet career path of the top municipal and regional secretaries of the Communist Party had developed along six trajectories.

Introduction

March 2005 marks the 20th anniversary of Gorbachev beginning perestroika. What path has Russia taken since that time and what became of the Communist Party nomenclature? What positions did they come to occupy over the last two decades and what positions do they occupy now? These lesser-discussed but crucially important aspects to post-Soviet power transition (especially at the sub-regional level) will be the chief focus of this article.

The fate of the nomenclature at the highest party level (secretaries and members of the Central Committee along with members of the Politburo of the Central Committee) is well-known. Much less is known about the regional nomenclature (secretaries and members of the Oblast party committee and bureaucracy) and almost nothing is known about the nomenclature at the sub-regional level (secretaries of the city and raion party committees). What did the first secretary of the rural party committee do after the fall of the Soviet Union? Who did he become? Did he become a respected official that flawlessly merged with the new power structures or did he become a semi-bungling leader that felt so pushed and prodded in all directions that he struggled with the emerging system of power?

When it concerns the sub-regional level, no one in Russia conducted these kinds of investigations into the system of power and its adaptation over time. It was Western political science that became the investigatory ‘Columbus’ of the Russian sub-regions

¹ The study of subregional elites has been made within the RGNF Project (No. 04-0300058a)
(this had already partly begun during the Soviet era). Books like *Soviet Local Politics and Government* [19] and *Local Power and Post-Soviet Politics* [11], which collected the work of both Russian and Western authors, gained immense recognition across the academic community. These efforts were, in essence, the first real scholarly attempts to study the late-stage Soviet and post-Soviet regional/sub-regional political expanse. While a few additional successful articles were subsequently investigated and published in the West [8, 10, 16, 17], it was not until the mid-1990s when the Slavic Research Center at Hokkaido University, under the financial support of the Ministry of Education, Technology, Sport and Culture of Japan, began a long series of projects that systematically, methodically, and uniformly studied Russian and Ukrainian sub-regions with the aim of reaching generalized conclusions [3, 7, 18].

It is important to emphasize that these projects finally mobilized Russian scholars (the vast majority of which were from the provinces) to study sub-regional politics. This revived and perhaps even saved ‘periphery’ scholars during this extremely difficult time from what was the quiet withering of the local sector of Russian regional scholarship. The ironic paradox in all of this was that the scholarly study of Russian regions after the ‘opening of the system’ in 1991 was in fact more open and accessible to foreign scholars than to native Russian ones.

In contrast to their foreign colleagues, who received significant grants at home to aid investigation and relieve material difficulties, there were basically no opportunities for serious comparative, archival or field research amongst Russian scholars. This was especially stark during the first half of the 1990s. Thus it was no coincidence that the first generalized, cross-regional investigations into the nomenclature of the Soviet Communist Party in article and monograph form were written by foreign authors [9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 20].

The Tambov case of sub-regional nomenclature transformation has already been documented by us in great detail [4, 5, 6]. Together with this we have undertaken an inter-regional comparison of seven subjects of the Russian Federation: the Ryazan, Samara, Tambov, and Ulyanovsk oblasts and the Mordovia, Udmurtia, and Chuvashia Republics. This approach we feel creates an adequate field for analysis as it encompasses two oblasts each from the Volga and Central Russian regions (these are traditional subjects for comparison in Russia) as well as three national republics with their extraordinarily high political diversity.

Why is the study of sub-regional politics in Russia important?

- Sub-regions are in fact an influential segment of Russian politics that are usually undervalued in the political literature.
- Sub-regional administrators were and are important actors across the board in the political process – under M.S. Gorbachev, B.N. Yeltsin and V.V. Putin
  - During Gorbachev’s regime they were the general secretary’s object of public attention as the innovators of perestroika from the raion committees collided with the ‘orthodox’ members of the Central Committee who wanted to maintain the status quo.
  - During the first half of the Yeltsin regime they were politicized, the center point of opposition to the President. During the elections in the mid-1990s sub-regional administrators emerged as the grass-roots foundation of a new nomenclature, as members of the emerging regional politico-economic clans that would come to power at the end of the 1990s.
  - During the Putin regime they were a buttress for the now fully-formed clans as well as being a mobilization mechanism for the voice of the people. The relevant question here is the effort of the nomenclature to emerge into these ‘clans of power’ and their ability to work under ‘the rules’ of the new system.
The Collision: 1991

Let us remember the historical context. The autumn of 1991 was the zenith of Yeltsin’s glory as concerns societal support (not popularity, mind you, but glory in the pop-culture movie-star sense). This glory was marked by the ovation stemming from the oblast committees, the renaming of newspapers, the removal of Derzhinskii’s statue from Lyubyanka Square and the naked pursuit of the local nomenclature with the shrill question - where were you on August 19? In a word, it was the apotheosis of an anti-communist democratic country. The new authority would be able to begin its reign with great effect and, in the sense of obtaining legitimacy, with great effectiveness. The way was open and obvious – if you would win through general, fair, direct, and transparent elections, in direct contradiction of Soviet experience, you would be infused by the very procedure with a real democratic essence. Such a task seemed wholly attainable.

If that was the case, then, why weren’t there such elections? The official explanation always returned first to the danger of a communist retrenchment, of a new August putsch, that the extraordinary circumstances hung the threat of the Russian state’s dissolution above everyone. These maxims (Don’t let Russia suffer the same fate of the Soviet Union!) were widely distributed both for public consumption and across the scholarly community [1. C. 161].

In short, the new Russia missed its chance for constituent elections (missed its chance for making a real movement to democracy) and began instead a transition the “Russian way.” This was in fact a tremendous mistake by the new authority, a barrier to the democratization of the country, a blow to the party system, and a main source of the bitter conflict that would emerge between the President and the Parliament.

In our view this mistake was largely false and man-made, connected with a critically low-brow and peculiar world-view that was inherent to the post-putsch Russian leadership. The new residents of the Kremlin not only understandably feared the Communist party, but they also didn’t believe in the personal victory they had just achieved and were not ready to fulfill a more responsible governance role. They possessed neither the statesman’s demeanor nor the legislative experience and thus found themselves buried deep in the captivity of decades-long complexes and stereotypes. From this foundation they inevitably positioned themselves like a fortress under siege and treated all around them as if they were enemies.

The Presidium of the Verkhovnii Soviet of the RSFSR, which had just before been a supporter of Yeltsin in opposition to the Soviet Union center, adopted a decision on September 6, 1991 to allow for the direct election of heads of regional administrations beginning on November 24, 1991. However the decision was subsequently vetoed: analysts for “Democratic Russia” prognosticated a tremendous defeat for the supporters of the President (at best they felt there might be 10 or 12 victories versus 36 iron-clad defeats). It was this very prognosis, which subsequently proved to be partly mistaken, that served as the basis for the realization of the “executive vertical.” As a result of this dramatic struggle the Russian Congress of People’s Deputies acquiesce to a resolution on November 1, 1991 that effectively placed a moratorium on elections across all administrative levels until December 1, 1992. As a consequence sub-regional authority was appointed in 1991 and would subsequently remain an appointed position across the majority of regions through three more electoral cycles (1996, 2000, 2004). Thus, in 1991 the new authority passed on constituent elections and began a “democratic” transition in the style of a Byzantine court. The procedure they developed, born from the President’s inner circle, was quite simple: the President would appoint governors while these, in turn, would appoint the heads of sub-regional administrations.
### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Heads</th>
<th>Ryazan</th>
<th>Samara</th>
<th>Tambov</th>
<th>Ulyanovsk</th>
<th>Moldova</th>
<th>Udmurcia</th>
<th>Chuvashia</th>
<th>Insum</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st secretary</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd secretary</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4,0</td>
<td>1,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chair, Dep. Chair Soviet</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>54,8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chair, Dep. Chair Exec. Soviet</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directorate</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>17,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6,0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Sum</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In more than half of the instances (52 %), the heads of administration were recruited from the chairs of the city and raion executive committees. The directorate and first secretaries lagged significantly behind, with only 17.6 % and 16.6 % respectively. The deputy chairs of the executive committees, the chairs and deputy chairs of the soviets added to the impressive success of Soviet apparatchiks (5.1 % and 4.6 % respectively). In total it worked out that 117 people came to leadership positions in the sub-regions (58.4 %) directly from the Soviet nomenclature apparatus. Most importantly, there were no striking inter-regional differences with this percentage, only a few exceptions. In Ryazan Oblast the chairs of the executive committees of the Soviets achieved an extraordinary 75.9 %. In Samara Oblast the divergent result came from the first secretaries with 28.6 %. In Udmurtia the directors were greatly represented with 34.5 %.

What accounts for the relative lack of success of the first secretaries? The continuous rotation of the oblast committee first secretaries (it came to be commonly known as the cadre meatgrinder) organized by the general secretary across the top echelons of the party hierarchy created a de facto collapsing interchangeability at the sub-regional level.

The continuous shifting of first secretaries across various locations placed them in a tremendously difficult position. Many who appeared in the sub-regions for the first time were immediately placed in the position of first secretary. For a non-competitive system with a continual rotation of cadres this would have been almost normal. In a competitive system this made the first secretaries politically doomed.

In March 1990 Gorbachev became the President of the USSR. Almost immediately he proclaimed a policy that allowed for the simultaneous holding of dual political office, thereby crudely raising the status of local soviet leaders. The elections for these local soviet deputies in 1990 became a bitter pill for the city and raion first secretaries. They were charged with the difficult task of finding a way to be elected to these local soviets and subsequently head them. Those who did not succeed in the task were consequently relieved of their right to head the city and raion committees. In the majority of sub-regions where the first secretaries succeeded in becoming the leaders of the local soviets they usually found themselves in collision with the directors of local industry (for example, in Samara and Ulyanovsk Oblasts and the Republic of Udmurtia.)
Table 2

Interchangeability of city and raion first secretaries of the Communist Party of USSR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ryazan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samara</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tambov</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulyanovsk</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mordovia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Udmutria</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuvashia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Sum</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>287</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>9,0</td>
<td>10,1</td>
<td>16,0</td>
<td>19,2</td>
<td>8,4</td>
<td>26,5</td>
<td>10,8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This collision acted as a direct hit on the authority of the first secretaries acting as the new chairs of local soviets and figuratively felt like someone was playing a cruel joke on them (in Tambov Oblast and the Republic of Chuvashia, for example). This “contra-elite” worked against the first secretaries/new soviet chairs, blocking all their attempts to penetrate the elite local power structure. Recruiting for the new elite thus came mostly from an old reservoir of power – the old guard Soviet party nomenclature with its preservation of an unadulterated pre-Perestroika rhetoric. In opposition to this development a democratic movement did emerge but in reality the aforementioned contra-elites by 1991 had formed the foundation of regional power.

In the regions, where the successes of the first secretaries had been more humble in 1990, an immediate substitution was consequently made in favor of the chairs of the city and raion executive committees. Thus the new federal authorities by 1991 had placed a political wager on their success instead. This was most easily symbolized by

Table 3

Chairs of local soviets (elections of 1990)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1st Secretary</th>
<th>Secretary</th>
<th>Chair, 1st Dep. Chair of Exec. Committee</th>
<th>Others (Directorate)</th>
<th>In Sum in the sub-regions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ryazan</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samara</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tambov</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulyanovsk</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mordovia</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Udmutria</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuvashia</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Sum</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>71,3</td>
<td>5,5</td>
<td>6,1</td>
<td>17,1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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President Yeltsin’s decree on July 20, 1991, “About the dismantling of the party” (O
deparitzatsii). In the Republic of Mordovia, for example, the local apparatchiks reacted
to the decree with a total demoralization and were subsequently more preoccupied with
finding new work [2. C. 166]. In the Republic of Bashkortostan only 34 city and raion
secretaries remained, in Tambov Oblast only 13. In most cases replacements would end
up being second secretaries who had no future prospects. These substitutions would
succeed in working at most for only a few weeks, while some only managed to work in
these positions a few days, even hours. These people were nearly without authority and
wholly unsuited for the role of head of local administration. The only remaining
“choice” to the first secretaries, becoming a source of regional support for the federal
center, was not much better.

Table 4

“Agents of Influence” for the federal center in the regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Name of regional leader</th>
<th>Mini-political bio</th>
<th>Sub-regional politics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Ryazan     | L.P. Bashmakov
(appointed)     | Industrial director, Chair of Oblast Exec. Committee (1988 – 1990)                | The domination of the chair and his recent subordinates |
| Samara     | K.A. Titov
(appointed)         | Deputy director of “Informatika”, Chair of city soviet (1990)                     | Support the exec. committee chair and his recent subordinates |
| Tambov     | V.D. Babenko
| Ulyanovsk  | V.V. Malafeev
|             | Y.F. Goryachev
(appointed)     |                                                                                   |                                                 |
| Mordovia   | V.D. Guslyannikov
(elected President of Mordovia, 12/22/1991) | Senior scholar of NPO, People’s Deputy (1990)                                    | Support the exec. Committee chair and agricultural directors |
| Udmurtia   | V.K. Tubilov
N.E. Mironov      | Chair of Supreme Soviet (1990) Chair SM (1989)                                   | Support the exec. Committee chair and agricultural directors |
“Partycrat” Y.F. Goryachev (Ulyanovsk Oblast), industrialist L.P. Bashmakov (Ryazan Oblast), academic V.D. Guslyannikov (Republic of Mordovia), doctor V.D. Babenko (Tambov Oblast), duma deputies V.K. Tubilov, N.E. Mironov (Republic of Udmurtria) and E.A. Kubarev, N.A. Zaitsev (Republic of Chuvashia), all acted according to one logic: chief support fell on the chairs of the local executive committees as they were the least politically dangerous. If for whatever reason the chairs were inappropriate, then the choice fell on the industrialists. Only in those instances where both chairs and industrialists were not available did they seek out “loyal” first secretaries of the new authority, capable actors of the democratic movement, or people who had fallen out of the nomenclature during the Soviet era. Indeed this process of appointing first secretaries was done only with great reluctance. The one exception to this process was K.A. Titov in Samara.

It was because of all this that the first secretaries only managed to maintain their positions in 15% of the cases. Simultaneously a small part of their number (less than 10%) did not fall from the nomenclature but simply exited into the oblast structures as the new heads of local administration needed experienced and young administrators. These first secretaries of the provinces who ended up in the oblast center were considered not dangerous and therefore acceptable. For example, first secretary of the Kotovsk city committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union O.I. Betin became the first deputy for the head of the Tambov Oblast administration in 1999. In the present day, Betin is now Governor of Tambov Oblast. In this way nearly a quarter of the leaders of the sub-regions were able to preserve a primary spot for themselves in the local organs of power.

The Transformation: 1992–2005

We have now shown why the events of 1991 did not allow the first secretaries many chances to hold on to their former positions of power. At best only a few of them were able to hold on to the reigns of power at the sub-regional level. We have explained how this collision of appointments happened throughout 1991-1992. It is now necessary to move forward, discussing the developments that have emerged since the fall of the Soviet Union.

After this appointing collision of 1991-1992, the sub-regions in Russia went through three electoral cycles (the mid-1990s, the late 1990s, and the beginning of the 21st century [the early 2000s, for lack of a better term]). Each successive cycle significantly weakened the position of the first secretaries. With each successive cycle the first secretaries suffered losses of around 50%. The first cycle put an end to their dominant leadership role in the sub-regions. The second cycle displayed the futility in attempting to return to power. The third cycle basically ended in a complete and total fiasco for the former first secretaries.

What accounts for these trends across the electoral cycles? This ‘washing away’ of the party nomenclature out of the local administration system can be explained through a number of circumstances.

During the elections of the mid-1990s the first secretaries who remained in power largely conceded to one of two groups: either to the minions of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) or to the local industrialists/businessmen (ironically, these candidates were often overlapping in the sub-regions). During this time the opposition leaders within the CPRF were concentrated mostly in the local legislative organs (the Soviets and Dumas) and were continuously on the attack. For them, the first secretaries – whether they be the heads of administration already or simply candidates for the position – were traitors and opponents to their overall agenda.
First secretaries of the City and Raion Committees of the CPSU – subregional leaders

(<++> = appointment of first secretaries as heads of administration [between elections])
(<-->) = removal of first secretaries as heads of administration [between elections])

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ryazan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samara</td>
<td>10+1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tambov</td>
<td>4+4–3</td>
<td>5–1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulyanovsk</td>
<td>7+1–1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mordovia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3–1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Udmurtiya</td>
<td>4+1–3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuvashiya</td>
<td>1+1–1</td>
<td>3+2–1</td>
<td>5–4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>In Sum</strong></td>
<td>33+8–8</td>
<td>27+2–3</td>
<td>23–4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Tambov Oblast, for example, during the elections for the head of the Muchkapskoi raion administration in December 1996, the raion committee for the CPRF issued a summons for its members to vote for A.V. Trubnikov as first secretary of the raion committee. Trubnikov was at the time only a farmer and had as the height of his Soviet career a position as instructor of the agricultural division of the raion committee of the CPSU. As a result, nine candidates ended up being carried to victory across the oblast because of the support of the CPRF. Amongst them were but three former first secretaries (Uvarovo, Staryuryevskii, and Mordvoskii raions). Fascinatingly and contrary to the conventional academic wisdom in the West, the Tambov communists simply ignored the former party nomenclature. The organizational structures of the CPRF instead supported representatives from the powerful industrial elite, who had been almost wholly unconnected to the former nomenclature.

The elections in the late 1990s clearly demonstrated that the only leader capable of mobilizing the popular vote was one that had become part of some clan, namely, one that was pro-presidential. At the local level a peculiar ‘party of power’ arose – formed from the various politico-economic groups that were stable enough to be consolidated around formal and informal leaders. The unity of such structures was established through official coordination, informal connections, coinciding interests on the personal front, and the manipulation of extreme dependence.

The elections in the early 2000s strengthened the trend toward clan development. Unfortunately for them, a place for the first secretaries did not get included in the logic of this new power structure. It quickly became clear, however, that there were other options, post-Soviet Union, for achieving a more-or-less comfortable standard of living found outside the organs of local administration. In fact, it would be more accurate to say that only the less successful first secretaries were ultimately recruited into the organs of local administration. For obvious financial reasons, these administrative positions were clearly on a secondary level in terms of priority. Two other sectors were easily more ideal – many wanted to head in the direction of industrial activity, as captains of new industry emerging with the privatization of state property. Still others pursued positions within the oblast administrative structures. Regardless of the choice,
both of these options were attractive in comparison with local administrations because of their swift opportunities for personal enrichment.

And so, where does that leave us if we now seek to find the tracks of the sub-regions’ original ‘local heroes’? What became of them and what finally were their long-term career trajectories?

**Conclusion – The Mutation of Local Power Explained**

The post-Soviet career of city and raion first secretaries evolved along six trajectories.

**First trajectory:** “The Boom – jumping to a new system.” This trajectory comprised governors, vice-governors, heads of oblast administrative structures, and top managers. It was less than 10% of the overall nomenclature and was marked by an ability to achieve increases in overall authoritative capacity. In 1991-1992 they became the new authority and ultimately their own self-interested protectors of the new order. These figures would have likely achieved a comparable status within the Soviet Union with but one significant difference: under the new system they were incomparably better off financially.

**Second trajectory:** “The Preservation – successfully maintaining the continuation of administrative-political activism.” This trajectory was comprised largely of the heads of oblast and raion administrations and was about 15% of the overall nomenclature. These figures managed to sustain their pre-1991 levels of authority. In addition to this they did not form a support network for the new powers within the system (as this effort would be too politically dangerous) and by the mid-1990s had already achieved an administrative distance between themselves and the top trajectory.

**Third trajectory:** “The Quasi-Survival – remaining in the system of administration but suffering a reduction in authority to secondary roles within municipal structures.” This trajectory comprised the largest percentage of the nomenclature, nearly 35%, and included the deputy heads of city and raion administration, the chairs and deputy chairs of city and raion soviets, and municipal workers who had achieved a higher administrative status pre-1991. These successes, though relative, did sometimes become significant: across a majority of sub-regions (57.1%) the first secretaries succeeded by 1990 in combining their post with another, usually chair of the local soviets. The dissolution of all local soviets, however, in 1993 ended this opportunity.

**Fourth trajectory:** “The Exchange – voluntarily transitioning away from political authority toward economic opportunities.” This trajectory was the second largest category (25%) and was largely comprised of the managers/directors of industry. A large number of industry and agricultural managers came into the party organs by answering the “Gorbachev summons” during the second half of the 1980s, as Gorbachev sought to produce a swift transformation of party cadres. This status gave them a significant advantage when the privatization of industry and agriculture began. These managers and directors eagerly returned to what was for them a more comfortable and habitual role of activity and quickly established for themselves an enviable standard of living.

**Fifth trajectory:** “The Orthodox – resisting the new system.” Comprising only 10% of the overall nomenclature, this group was mostly made up of the first secretaries of the official raion and city branches of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. They successfully clung to their orthodox rhetoric and became ideological fighters against the new system. In the first half of the 1990s this trend was actually rather popular. The calculation to pursue this course of action paid off in the success of
G.A. Zyuganov as a potential candidate for Russian Federation President and in their own personal success as the most believable and trusted heads of local administration. In the present day such opposition to the authority of V.V. Putin is not only futile but almost masochistic. Today this trajectory is basically closed.

**Sixth trajectory: “The Exit – retiring into the pension system.”** This age group, who were mainly the most elderly first secretaries of the local Communist Party branches, made up only 5% of the total nomenclature. For the most part they put in for retirement immediately after the failed coup attempt in 1991.

And so this article has elaborated on six trajectories which explain the general mutation and directional flow of authority and power of the sub-regional party nomenclature after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. While this article certainly provides proof of the fusion between municipal service and business, it also shows the subtlety and diversity of options from which the late-stage Soviet nomenclature was able to choose. Clearly some options regarding lines of authority dominated over others. What should be emphasized, however, is how closely those choices that dominated ultimately gave foreshadowing for some of the most significant problems and flaws that would occur throughout the 1990s as Russia tried to complete its transition to democracy and a free-market economy. The poor choices and frustrations of the sub-regional nomenclature were often ultimately mirrored in poor choices and frustrations within the transition.

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Мутирующая власть: 
отслеживая изменения властных позиций субрегиональной номенклатуры КПСС в позднесоветское и постсоветское время (1985–2005)

Д.Г. Сельцер¹, М.Д. Кросстон²

Тамбовский государственный университет имени Г.Р. Державина (1); 
Университет Клемсон, США (2)

Ключевые слова и фразы: Горбачев; местная и региональная номенклатура КПСС; перестройка; Советский и постсоветский транзит; траектория карьерного движения.

Аннотация: Что случилось с номенклатурой КПСС после начала перестройки, инициированной М.С. Горбачевым? Чтобы ответить на этот вопрос, было предпринято сравнительное изучение семи российских регионов – уникальный исследовательский проект в российской политической науке. Постсоветский путь первых секретарей ГК и РК КПСС развивался по шести траекториям.

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Résumé: Qu’est-ce qui est arrivée avec la nomenclature du PCUS depuis le commencement de la péréstroika initiée par M.S. Gorbachev. Pour répondre à cette question on a abordé l’étude de sept régions – étude unique dans la science politique russe. La voie postsoviétique des premiers secrétaires des comités des villes et des régions du PCUS se développaient d’après six orientations.